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III. Jurisdictional Statement 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
IV. Statement of Issues & Standard of Review 
The issues in this matter and the corresponding standards of review are as follows: 
A . Improper Statutory Construction 
Is the express limitation of Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 that a grantor by warranty 
deed need only defend against "lawful claims" meaningless so that such a grantor must defend 
all claims, including those that are unlawful because they are brought in violation of statute and 
dismissed on motion for summary judgment? The standard of review for this issue is 
correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) 
Was the lower court summary judgment decision, ordering appellant Spencer to pay 
attorney fees to a grantee, correct in light of the fact that those fees were incurred solely in 
defending a suit which sought, as to grantee, only remedies prohibited by Utah Code 
Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6, and which suit, as to grantee, was brought in violation of Title 
57, Chapters 4a and 9? The standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference 
given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 
1998) 
B . Improper Imposition of Duty to Defend 
Is a one sentence allegation that a duty to defend title exists, alleged solely as a 
conclusion of law, with no other action to present the case or facts to the party alleged to have 
that duty to defend, a sufficient basis on which to impose over $40,000 in duplicative legal 
expenses on the person with the alleged duty? The standard of review for this issue is 
correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) 
1 
Is imposition of a duty to defend title appropriate where purchaser has agreed, in 
writing, that the property is being purchased "as is" with respect to title? The 
standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision. 
Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) 
Is imposition of a general duty to defend title appropriate where the party being charged 
to defend has entered into a written agreement with the title company which was a party to the 
sale and which is the real party in interest as to the award of attorney fees, to send written 
notice and demand to defend before such defense, where liability for one of the two plaintiffs is 
specifically excluded, and where such notice was not sent? The standard of review for this 
issue is correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) 
C • Improper Standard for Decision of Summary Judgment 
Was the lower court summary judgment decision, which resolved factual inferences, 
including the adequacy of tender and reasonableness of attorney fees, against the non-moving 
party, correct? The standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference given to 
the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) 
Was the lower court summary judgment decision granting summary judgment in spite 
of substantial factual disputes regarding material issues, including the adequacy of tender and 
reasonableness of attorney fees, correct? The standard of review for this issue is correctness, 
with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 
464, 465 (Utah 1998) 
D . Unreasonableness of Fees Assessed 
Are attorney fees of more than $40,000 reasonable when the claim in which they are 
incurred defending: is brought in violation of statute; seeks remedies prohibited by statute; is 
brought 16 years after the claim arose; is based upon contracts which prohibit the remedies 
sought; is based upon contracts which limit the plaintiffs' maximum recovery to $30,000; is 
being defended already by another defendant; and is resolved against plaintiffs on summary 
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judgment. The standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference given to the 
lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) 
E . Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issues 
The matters sought for review on this appeal were preserved below at Record pages 77-
85, 88-91, 108-126, 136-137, 216-217, 404-406, 504-505, 761-775, 779-781, 881-888, 
1184-1189, 1198-1221, 1330-1345, 1380-1384, 1409-1410, 1413-1414, and transcript of 
October 6, 1999 hearing. 
V. Constitutional or Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-l-12Error! Bookmark not defined. 
§ 57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to _ (insert name), grantee, of 
(insert place of residence), for the sum of dollars, the 
following described tract of land in County, Utah, to wit: 
(here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this _ day of , 19 . 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges 
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good right 
to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the 
quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and 
that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will forever warrant and 
defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all 
LAWFUL CLAIMS whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be 
briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the land. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6. (See Addendum.) 
Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 4a.(See Addendum.) 
Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 9.(See Addendum.) 
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VI. Statement of the Case 
This case is the appeal of a summary judgment decision disposing of all of the issues 
with respect to one of the named defendants in the case below and certified by the lower court 
as a final decision. The case below was a suit by some alleged investors to obtain damages 
against Mr. Spencer, and title to property as to Holmes Construction, based upon contracts 
allegedly entered in 1981 or 1982. The contracts which allegedly gave rise to the plaintiffs 
claims provided for dissolution of the purported partnerships no later than 1984. The suit was 
not brought until 1997. Mr. Spencer had obtained record title to the property in 1994 and sold 
the property to Holmes in 1996. Although they had done nothing to comply with Utah's 
Occupying Claimants statute (Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6), plaintiffs sought to 
wrest title from Holmes construction by the action. 
Mr. Spencer's answer asserted numerous defenses applicable to Holmes, including 
failure to state a claim, lack of standing, laches, abuse of process, and statute of limitations. 
Mr. Spencer's answer denied that Holmes had any liability to plaintiffs. Holmes undertook on 
their own to defend title, making no demand for defense by Mr. Spencer prior to filing their 
answer. In their answer they alleged, in a single sentence, that Mr. Spencer had a legal duty to 
defend their title. That allegation was objected to as a legal conclusion rather than an allegation 
of fact, but denied to the extent it was deemed a statement of fact. 
Holmes waited approximately a year1 after the case was commenced to move for 
summary judgment against plaintiffs. That motion was granted. 
Thereafter, Holmes moved for summary judgment against Mr. Spencer, claiming that 
Mr. Spencer had a duty to defend Holmes' title and that duty had been violated. The lower 
court eventually granted that motion and certified the decision as final. This appeal was timely 
filed. 
1
 The complaint was filed 7/18/97, Holmes' motion against plaintiffs was filed 7/1/98. 
4 
VII. Statement of Facts 
In 1981, one of the defendants in the case below, Mr. George Gamble, entered into a 
contract to buy certain undeveloped land in the Park City area of Summit County for 
development as condominiums. Later in 1981 that contract was fulfilled in sections, with one 
parcel being deeded to the name "Summit Condo IV." In 1982, that property was deeded to 
defendant Spencer-Gamble Development. 
In late 1982 defendant Gamble abandoned all of his obligations and interests in Utah 
and moved to California, leaving defendant Spencer as the sole remaining partner in Spencer-
Gamble Development. Later, Gamble quitclaimed all of his interests to property to Mr. 
Spencer. In 1994, Mr. Spencer deeded the property to himself. In 1996, after years of effort 
to develop the property, Mr. Spencer sold the property to Holmes Construction. That purchase 
was made subject to a contract that the property, including title, was conveyed "as is."2 As 
part of the transaction, Mr. Spencer entered into a written agreement that he would defend title 
only as to claims by Webster, and that Associated Title was required to provide Spencer with 
written notice of their desire to have Spencer defend before any such obligation would accrue.3 
In 1997, plaintiffs here brought suit, claiming that they were "partners" under joint 
venture agreements with Gamble dating from 1981 and 1982 and that they were therefore 
entitled to possession of the property. The terms of the documents under which plaintiffs are 
claiming expressly limit them to a total of 14.81% of the net profits from the land. The gross 
sale price of the land was $236,000, with the net pay out from closing, as was reported to 
Holmes, being $146,000. 14.81% of $236,000 is approximately $30,000. 14.81% of 
2
 R. 1217,1 9. 
3
 R. 1204-1206, especially f 3 on p. 1204, show that only parties to the Summit Condo 4 
joint venture agreement were covered. Webster was ostensibly a party to that agreement, 
but Byington was not. R 1205, f 9 B & C state that Associates must place a demand on 
Mr. Spencer for his obligation to indemnify to ripen. 
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$146,000 approximately $21,000.4 Plaintiffs made no efforts to comply with Utah Code 
Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6, which provides that possession of property against an 
occupying claimant cannot be obtained except upon strict compliance with requirements set for 
therein. Plaintiffs' claims also ignore the provisions of Chapters 1, 4a, and 9 of that Title. 
Plaintiffs had taken no action to perfect an ownership interest in the property at any time prior 
to the filing of the suit in 1997. 
When defendant Holmes was served with a suit, rather than contacting Mr. Spencer to 
defend the suit, Holmes notified Associated Title to defend, and Associated Title notified their 
insurer to defend, who in turn obtained a lawyer who, also without contacting Spencer, 
answered and filed a cross-claim against Spencer, alleging as a conclusion of law that Spencer 
had a legal duty to defend title. Other than that single conclusory allegation, Holmes never 
broached the subject of Spencer defending, and, in fact, Holmes counsel rebuffed offers of 
assistance made by Mr. Spencer's counsel and Holmes themselves refused Mr. Spencer's 
direct offers of assistance. Associated Title never sent Mr. Spencer the notice required by his 
contract.5 
Holmes counsel moved for summary judgment against plaintiffs. That motion was 
granted and the resulting dismissal has not been appealed. Holmes then moved for summary 
judgment against Spencer, seeking over $40,000 in attorney fees based upon the alleged failure 
of Spencer to defend. Spencer opposed that motion on several bases: 
The claim was unlawful and therefore not subject to a duty to defend title; 
There was no reasonable opportunity for Spencer to defend, his offers having been 
rejected and Holmes running its own defense exclusively; 
The attorney fees were excessive since the approximately $45,000 sought was more 
than twice the limiting percentage of the pay out, and 50% greater than the maximum 
4
 R. 1332-1342, 1343-1344 
5 Docket; R 108-126, 136-137. 
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possible recovery and because they were duplicative; and 
Holmes' laconic allegation was legally insufficient in light of the facts and procedural 
posture of the case.6 
Spencer pointed out to the lower court that the "facts" in support of Holmes' motion for 
summary judgment omitted to allege that (1) the amounts expended were reasonable, (2) the 
amounts expended were necessary, (3) the amounts expended were actually paid for by 
Holmes, (4) the amounts expended were incurred solely in defense of a "lawful claim," and (5) 
the amounts expended were expended after a refusal on the part of Mr. Spencer to defend 
Holmes title.7 
VIII. Summary of Argument 
The decision below is incorrect and must be reversed as a matter of law because it is 
based upon a construction of Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 that renders part of that statute 
meaningless and is therefore an impermissible construction. The decision below requires 
defense of title in all circumstances, even when claims are facially illegal. That is contrary to 
the express statutory language requiring defenses only of "lawful claims." The decision also 
grants Holmes relief to which it had not completed the steps necessary to obtain the relief 
granted and therefore must be reversed. 
The decision below must be reversed because it imposed upon defendant Spencer a 
duty to defend title in circumstances where such a duty to defend did not exist: i.e., (1) the 
property title was sold with notice to the purchaser that it was being sold "as is;" (2) the only 
action of purchasers that even suggests that purchasers might want Spencer to defend their title 
was a one sentence allegation in Holmes' answer that alleged Mr. Spencer had a legal duty to 
defend Holmes (there was no notice or demand from the title company as the contract requires); 
(3) the real party in interest (the title insurance company) had signed an agreement limiting the 
6
 R. 761-775, 779-781. 
7
 Spencer's motion in opposition to Holmes summary judgment motion, Id. 
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number of people as to whom Mr. Spencer was liable to defend claims and required the title 
company to give Mr. Spencer a demand, by letter, to defend. Neither of those limitations was 
complied with by Holmes or their insurer. 
The decision appealed is one for summary judgment. That decision must be reversed 
because it was entered in the face of disputed material facts, and contrary to law, the decision 
views the facts and draws all inferences against Mr. Spencer, the non-moving party. 
In addition, in light of the facts that the costs assessed were incurred solely to obtain 
summary judgment against claims which were brought in violation of statute; sought remedies 
prohibited by statute; which were brought 16 years after the claim arose; were based upon 
contracts which prohibit the remedies sought; were being defended already by Mr. Spencer; the 
amount of attorney fees awarded was unreasonable and excessive. 
IX . Argument 
A. Improper Statutory Construction 
The court below imposed a strict liability standard for defense of title by Mr. Spencer. 
The decision of the lower court makes Mr. Spencer liable for Holmes cost of defending title 
without regard to whether the claims against Holmes were valid or even colorable and without 
regard to whether the legal requirements for such an imposition had been met. In fact, the 
plaintiffs claims against Holmes were not valid or colorable and the legal requirements for 
imposition of costs and fees had not been met. At the time the decision appealed here had been 
entered, Holmes summary judgment, dismissing all of plaintiffs claims against Holmes, was 
final and non-appealable. Therefore, as a matter of law, those claims were invalid and not 
warranted by law. 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 states that a grantor by warranty deed need only 
defend against "lawful claims." 
Plaintiffs claim against Holmes was simply not a "lawful claim," as is shown by the 
fact that it was disposed of by summary judgment. Black's Law Dictionary 797 (5th ed. 1979) 
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defines "lawful" as "warranted or authorized by the law." That definition is in accord with the 
use of the phrase "lawful claim" in Utah cases. For example, In re Fish's Estate, 98 Utah 288; 
95 P.2d 502 (Utah 1939) involved a matter in which a stipulation for resolution of disputed 
claims to a decedent's estate directed the payment of "All lawful claims, expenses, and 
charges of administration, attorneys fees, Federal Estate Taxes, Federal Gift taxes, and 
Inheritance taxes of the State of Utah,...." The administrators were to pay only those claims 
that were "warranted or authorized by the law," and not spurious claims nor claims not so 
authorized. 
Tarpey v. Madsen, 17 Utah 352; 53 P. 996 (Utah 1898) involved the construction of 
various homestead and railroad acts. One issue specifically decided was whether the claim of 
Moroni Olney was a lawful claim. The Utah Supreme Court examined the legal requirements 
for a valid claim, determined that Mr. Olney had satisfied all of them, and pronounced Mr. 
Olney's claim to be "lawful." The language of the case makes it clear that if the claim of Olney 
were not valid under the law the claim would not be a "lawful claim." 
The lower court, by ruling that on the undisputed facts of this case there was no legal 
basis for plaintiffs' claim against Holmes' title, had, at the time it issued summary judgment 
against Mr. Spencer, already determined that plaintiffs' claim was not a "lawful claim." In 
fact, Utah's statutes, including without limitation, Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6, 
forbid the relief requested by plaintiffs as to Holmes. Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 does not 
require that title be defended against spurious or unlawful claims of the type brought by 
plaintiffs below against Holmes. 
Chapter 4a provides that all recorded documents are entitled to certain presumptions, 
none of which were addressed by plaintiffs' complaint and which plaintiffs had no evidence to 
rebut. Chapter 6 provides that property may not be taken from an occupying claimant who has 
improved property unless certain procedures are followed. Notwithstanding the fact that 
Holmes had improved the property, plaintiffs complied with none of Chapter 6's requirements 
in seeking possession of the property. Chapter 9 of Title 57 provides that purchasers are 
9 
entitled to rely upon record title. Holmes did so and plaintiffs showed no basis to overcome 
such reliance. In light of the above, it is clear that plaintiffs suit against Holmes was not a 
lawful claim and therefore not one which Mr. Spencer can be required to indemnify Holmes. 
Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 404 (1970) establishes the 
proposition that expenditures may only be recovered if they are "necessary to clear up any 
difficulty which would represent a substantial flaw in his title." As is discussed above, Mr. 
Spencer offered to and did provide defense of the title and the claims did not represent a 
"substantial" or even a colorable, flaw in the title. The costs and fees of Holmes are therefore 
not recoverable under Utah law. 
The same cases also establish that there must be either a constructive or actual eviction 
before there is a violation of the obligations imposed by Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12. No 
eviction of any kind, constructive or actual, has been alleged in this case. The costs and fees 
are therefore, again, not recoverable. 
In order to reach the result appealed here, the lower court had to render the "lawful 
claim" language of the statue meaningless so that a grantor under a warranty deed must defend 
all claims, including those that are unlawful because they are brought in violation of statute and 
dismissed on motion for summary judgment. That contravenes the Utah rules of statutory 
construction. 
In Trail Mountain Coal v. Div. Of lands, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court, citing Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995), stated: 
If, as Trail Mountain claims, the statute were limited to adverse 
possession claims, the language "or the issues or profits thereof" would be 
rendered superfluous. "This court will NOT construe a statute in such 
a way as to render certain viable parts meaningless and void." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995) is a particularly 
compelling case for this principle because, in Nelson, the Supreme Court struck down the 
entire statute rather than construe it in such a way as to make part of it meaningless. 
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Since the decision below is in violation of the Utah law upon which it ostensibly rests, 
it must be reversed. 
B . Improper Imposition of Duty to Defend 
When Mr. Spencer sold the property to Holmes, it was done pursuant to documents 
that expressly stated that property title was sold "as is." Notwithstanding that fact, the lower 
court imposed upon Mr. Spencer the burden of defending Holmes title. At the time Holmes 
purchased the property, the real party in interest as to the duty to defend title, Holmes' title 
insurer, caused Mr. Spencer to enter into an agreement for indemnification. That 
indemnification was limited to actions by certain persons. Only one of the plaintiffs in this 
action, Mr. Webster, was in that category. In spite of that fact, the lower court required Mr. 
Spencer to bear the entire burden of Holmes defense. In addition, the documents executed by 
Mr. Spencer were written by Holmes' insurer and require that before Mr. Spencer could be 
required to defend title, the insurer had to place a demand upon Mr. Spencer. They did not do 
so and there is no evidence that they did. In spite of that failure, the lower court required Mr. 
Spencer to pay the cost of Holmes' title defense. 
Not only did the lower court impose a defense obligation where the law regarding such 
obligations would not, the lower court did so in derogation of the contractual agreements of the 
parties. The documents related to limitations of Mr. Spencer were before the lower court, but 
they were ignored by the lower court in the decision in favor of Holmes. The decision must, 
therefore, be reversed. 
C . Improper Standard for Decision of Summary Judgment 
In Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports 
Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1995), this court stated, "In determining the propriety of a 
grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the position of the 
losing party. Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781. We review the trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness. Id." The lower court decision cannot stand that level of scrutiny. 
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As is discussed above, the lower court resolved all doubts and drew all inferences in 
favor of Holmes. The lower court resolved the factual issue of whether Holmes had given 
Spencer a reasonable opportunity to defend Holmes against Mr. Spencer. The lower court 
resolved the factual issue of reasonableness of $45,000 to obtain summary judgment for a 
claim that was facially illegal against Mr. Spencer. 
Mr. Spencer pointed out to the lower court that Mr. Maak apparently expended over 
five man-weeks (more than 200 hours) answering the complaint, performing discovery, and 
moving for summary judgment. In contrast, the undersigned spent 73.25 hours during 1997 
and 57.25 hours during 1998 and 1999 doing all of the same things as were done by Holmes' 
counsel, as well as taking care of additional matters, such as the motions to dismiss that were 
prosecuted on behalf of Holmes, among others. The total hours expended by Mr. Spencer 
amount to approximately 1/2 of the time for which Holmes was awarded reimbursement. 
Mr. Spencer informed the lower court by affidavit that he had offered to defend the 
action for Holmes.8 That offer was ignored. Holmes never provided Mr. Spencer or his 
counsel with any information necessary to defend. Mr. Spencer and his counsel nevertheless 
filed motions to dismiss, undertook discovery, and did all other acts they could to remove 
Holmes from the suit, including joining in the motion for summary judgment which ultimately 
succeeded in accomplishing that end. 
According to 59 Am Jur 2d Parties, § 187, 'tendering the defense' is a device to bring 
in a person not present in the action and offer that person "an opportunity to appear and defend 
the action." As is discussed above, Mr. Spencer answered the complaint and attacked 
plaintiffs' claims. Without some cooperation and communication from Holmes, it was 
impossible for Spencer to do more than he did. A "tender" must be more than a mere recitation 
of words if it is to be effective. All of the above, and the facts to support the same were 
8
 R. 761-763, 779-781. 
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presented to the lower court. Notwithstanding that dispute of fact, the lower court made the 
factual determination that Mr. Spencer had refused to defend Holmes. 
The lower court assumed, among other things, that the following facts, which were not 
alleged by Holmes, were true: (1) the amounts expended were reasonable, (2) the amounts 
expended were necessary, (3) the amounts expended were actually paid for by Holmes, (4) the 
amounts expended were incurred solely in defense of a "lawful claim," and (5) the amounts 
expended were expended after a refusal on the part of Mr. Spencer to defend Holmes title. 
None of those facts were supported by appropriate evidence below and all were disputed by 
Mr. Spencer. 
Because the lower court's decision violates the standards for granting summary 
judgment, the decision must be reversed. 
D . Unreasonableness of Fees Assessed 
Holmes was awarded attorney fees and costs of more than $40,000. Those fees were 
for work which was largely duplicative of work performed by Mr. Spencer's attorney and 
which could have been avoided had Holmes accepted Mr. Spencer's offers of help. 
Furthermore, as is discussed above, the claims against Holmes were facially improper. It is 
prima facie unreasonable to run up legal bills for a year before moving to dismiss such claims. 
There was nothing that was done by Holmes' counsel after expending the large amount of fees 
that could not have been done immediately upon receipt of the complaint. The fees awarded 
were therefore unreasonable and must be reduced or eliminated. 
X . Conclusion 
The decision of the court being appealed was wrong on the law and unsupported by 
facts, when considered under the applicable standard. The decision must therefore be 
reversed. 
13 
Since the award was based upon a failure to follow the law of the state of Utah, and 
since that law prevents the award granted, that reversal should be final and not associated with 
a remand. 
Dated: Tuesday, January 9, 2001 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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XI . Addendum (Emphasis added.) 
CHAPTER 4a EFFECTS OF RECORDING 
57-4a-l. Document recordable despite defects. 
Each document executed and acknowledged on or before July 1,1988, may be 
recorded in the office of the county recorder regardless of any defect or irregularity in its 
execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. 
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects. 
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect, 
irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified copy of a 
recorded document is admissible as evidence to the same extent the original document would be 
admissible as evidence. 
57-4a-3. Document recordable without acknowledgment. 
A document or a certified copy of a document may be recorded without 
acknowledgment if: 
(1) it was executed under law existing at the time of execution; 
(2) it evidences or affects title to real property; and 
(3) it was issued under the authority of: 
(a) the United States, another state, a court of record, a foreign government, or an 
Indian tribe; or 
(b) this state or any of its political subdivisions but, any document executed under the 
authority of this state or any of its political subdivisions after July 1, 1988, may not be 
recorded unless it includes a certificate of acknowledgement or jurat. 
57-4a-4. Presumptions. 
5) A recorded document creates the following presumptions 
regarding title to the real property affected: 
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(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to 
execute it; 
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it 
is executed are the persons they purport to be; 
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a 
minor at any relevant time; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates 
on the document and the date of recording; 
(e) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or 
described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times; 
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer 
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity: 
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of 
his authority; 
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all 
applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and 
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted 
for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time; 
(h) a person executing the document as an individual: 
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or 
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on the 
effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and the grantor received 
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of the 
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201 through 75-2-207; 
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final determination in a 
judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of eminent domain, 
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the court, official body, or condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the 
execution of the document were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without 
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are 
true. 
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the 
document purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or 
interest of the person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is 
executed. 
CHAPTER 6 OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS 
57-6-1. Stay of execution of judgment of possession. 
Where an occupant of real estate has color of title to the real estate, and in 
good faith has made valuable improvements on the real estate, and is 
afterwards in a proper action found not to be the owner, no execution shall 
issue to put the owner in possession of the real estate after the filing of a 
complaint as hereinafter provided, until the provisions of this chapter have 
been complied with. 
57-6-2. Claimant to commence action - Complaint - Trial of issues. 
Such complaint must set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks 
relief, stating as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive 
of the improvements thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the 
value of such improvements. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, 
and the value of the real estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the 
trial. 
57-6-3. Rights of parties - Acquiring otherfs interest or holding as 
tenants in common. 
The plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay the appraised value of the 
improvements and take the property, but should he fail to do so after a reasonable time, to be 
fixed by the court, the defendant may take the property upon paying its value, exclusive of the 
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improvements. If this is not done within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the parties 
will be held to be tenants in common of all the real estate, including the improvements, each 
holding an interest proportionate to the values ascertained on the trial. 
57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color of title. 
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale made by the proper person or 
officer has color of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person or officer 
has sufficient authority to sell, unless the want of authority was known to the purchaser at the 
time of the sale. 
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real 
estate by himself, or by those under whom he claims, for the term of five 
years, or who has occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he 
claims, have at any time during the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, 
express or implied, of the real owner made any valuable improvements on the 
real estate, or if he or those under whom he claims have at any time during the 
occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real estate for any one year, 
and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the owner, and the 
occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action is brought by which 
the recovery of the real estate is obtained. 
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or representatives. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title against their 
landlords or give any person a claim under color of title to school or institutional trust lands as 
defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6). 
57-6-5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract deemed occupying 
claimants. 
When any person has settled upon any real estate and occupied the same for three years 
under or by virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers of the state for the purchase 
thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from, the United States, and shall 
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have made valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be the owner thereof, or 
not to have acquired a right to purchase the same from the state or the United States, such 
person shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of this chapter. 
57-6-6. Setoff against claim for improvements. 
In the cases above provided for, if the occupying claimant has committed any injury to 
the real estate by cutting timber, or otherwise, the plaintiff may set the same off against any 
claim for improvements made by the claimant. 
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession may issue. 
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an execution to put him in possession of his 
property in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, but not otherwise. 
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants of land granted to state-
Any person having improvements on any real estate granted to the state in aid of any 
work of internal improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by another, may remove such 
improvements without injury otherwise to such real estate, at any time before he is evicted 
therefrom, or he may claim and have the benefit of this chapter by proceeding as herein 
directed. 
CHAPTER 9 MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE 
57-9-1. What constitutes marketable record title. 
Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an unbroken 
chain of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or more, shall be deemed to have a 
marketable record title to such interest as defined in Section 57-9-8, subject only to the matters 
stated in Section 57-9-2. A person shall be deemed to have such an unbroken chain 
of title when the official public records disclose a conveyance or other title 
transaction, of record not less than forty years at the time the marketability is 
to be determined, which said conveyance or other title transaction purports to 
create such interest, either in 
(1) the person claiming such interest or 
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(2) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title 
transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested in the person claiming such 
interest with nothing appeanng of record, m either case, purporting to divest such claimant of 
such purported interest. 
57-9-2. Rights and interests to which marketable record title is subject. 
The marketable record title is subject to: 
(1) all interests and defects which are inherent m the muniments of which such chain of 
record title is formed, except that a general reference m the muniments or any of them, to 
easements, use restnctions, or other interests created pnor to the root of title is not sufficient to 
preserve them, unless specific identification is made therein of a recorded title transaction 
which creates the easement, use restnction, or other interest; 
(2) all interests preserved by the filing of proper notice or by possession by the same 
owner continuously for a penod of 40 years or more, in accordance with Section 57-9-4, 
(3) the nghts of any person ansmg from prescnptive use or a penod of adverse 
possession or user, which was m whole or m part subsequent to the effective date of the root 
of title; 
(4) any interest ansmg out of a title transaction which has been recorded subsequent to 
the effective date of the root of title from which the unbroken chain of title of record is started, 
except that the recording does not revive or give validity to any interest which has been 
extinguished pnor to the time of the recording by the operation of Section 57-9-3; and 
(5) the exceptions stated in Section 57-9-6 as to nghts of reversioners m leases, as to 
apparent easements and interests m the nature of easements, as to the nght, title, or interests of 
the state m school or institutional trust lands or sovereign lands, and as to interests of the 
United States. 
57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and clear of interests, claims, 
and charges. 
Subject to Sections 57-9-2 and 57-9-6: 
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(1) the marketable record title shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any 
person dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims, or charges, whatsoever, the 
existence of which depends upon any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to 
the effective date of the root of title; and 
(2) all such interests, claims, or charges, however denominated, whether legal or 
equitable, present or future, whether the interests, claims, or charges are asserted by a person 
sui juris or under a disability, whether the person is within or without the state, whether the 
person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are declared to be void. 
57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized - Effect of 
possession of land by record owner of possessory interest. 
(1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective such 
interest by filing for record during the forty-year period immediately following the effective 
date of the root of title of the person whose record title would otherwise be marketable, a notice 
in writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of 
knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of the forty-year 
period. The notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting in 
behalf of any claimant who is 
(a) under a disability, 
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or 
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of 
filing the notice of claim for record. 
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in possession 
of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during which period no title 
transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in his chain of title, and no notice has 
been filed by him or on his behalf as provided in Subsection (1), and such possession 
continues to the time when marketability is being determined, such period of possession shall 
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be deemed equivalent to the filing of the notice immediately preceding the termination of the 
forty-year period described in Subsection (1). 
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest - Contents - Filing for record. 
In order to be effective and to be recorded, the notice required by Section 57-9-4 shall 
contain a legal description of all land affected by the notice. If the claim is founded upon a 
recorded instrument, then the description in the notice may be the same as that contained in the 
recorded instrument. The notice shall be recorded in the county or counties where the land 
described is situated. 
57-9-6. Applicability of provisions. 
This act may not be applied to bar: 
(1) any lessor or his successor as a reversioner of his right to possession on the 
expiration of any lease; or 
(2) extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement created or held for 
any pipeline, highway, railroad or public utility purpose, or any easement or interest in the 
nature of an easement, the existence of which is clearly observable by physical evidence of its 
use; or 
(3) extinguish any water rights, whether evidenced by decrees, by certificates of 
appropriation, by diligence claims to the use of surface or underground water or by water 
users' claims filed in general determination proceedings; or 
(4) extinguish any right, title, estate, or interest in and to minerals, and any 
development, mining, production or other rights or easements related to the minerals or 
exercisable in connection with the minerals; or 
(5) any right, title, or interest of the state in school or institutional trust lands or 
sovereign lands; or 
(6) any right, title, or interest of the United States, by reason of failure to file the notice 
herein required. 
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57-9-7. Existing statutes of limitations and recording statutes not 
affected. 
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to extend the period for the 
bringing of an action or for the doing of any other required act under any 
statutes of limitations, nor, except as herein specifically provided, to affect 
the operation of any statutes governing the effect of the recording or the 
failure to record any instrument affecting land. 
57-9-8. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) The words "marketable record title" mean a title of record as indicated in Section 57-
9-1, which operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date 
of the root of title, as are stated in Section 57-9-3. 
(2) The word "records" includes probate and other official public records, as well as 
records in the registry of deeds. 
(3) The word "recording," when applied to the official public records of a probate or 
other court, includes filing. 
(4) The words "person dealing with land" include a purchaser of any estate or interest 
therein, a mortgagee, a levying or attaching creditor, a land contract vendee, or any other 
person seeking to acquire an estate or interest therein, or impose a lien thereon. 
(5) The words "root of title" mean that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain 
of title of a person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, upon which he 
relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded 
as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined. The effective 
date of the "root of title" is the date on which it is recorded. 
(6) The words "title transaction" mean any transaction affecting title to any interest in 
land, including title by will or descent, title by tax deed, or by trustee's, referee's, guardian's, 
executor's, administrator's, master in chancery's, or sheriffs deed, or decree of any court, as 
well as warranty deed, quitclaim deed, or mortgage. 
57-9-9. Legislative purpose and construction. 
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This act shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of 
simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely 
on a record chain of title as described in Section 57-9-1 of this act, subject 
only to such limitations as appear in Section 57-9-2 of this act. 
57-9-10. Extension of limitation period. 
If the forty-year period specified in this act shall have expired prior to two years after 
the effective date of this act, such period shall be extended two years after the effective date of 
this act. 
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